This paper explores whether natural resource abundance is a curse or a blessing. To do so, we …rstly develop a theory consistent econometric model, in which we show that there is a long run relationship between real income, the investment rate, and the real value of oil production. Secondly, we investigate the long-run (level) impacts of natural resource abundance on domestic output as well as the short-run (growth) e¤ects. Thirdly, we explicitly recognize that there is a substantial cross-sectional dependence and cross-country heterogeneity in our sample, which covers 53 oil exporting and importing countries with very di¤erent historical and institutional backgrounds, and adopt the non-stationary panel methodologies developed by Pesaran (2006) and Pedroni (2000) for estimation. Our results, using the real value of oil production, rent or reserves as a proxy for resource endowment, reveal that oil abundance has a positive e¤ect on both income levels and economic growth. While we accept that oil rich countries could bene…t more from their natural wealth by adopting growth and welfare enhancing policies and institutions, we challenge the common view that oil abundance a¤ects economic growth negatively.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the following questions: Is an abundance of natural resources, in particular oil, a curse or a blessing? What are the e¤ects of natural resource abundance on levels of per capita output and economic growth in general? Following the in ‡uential work by Sachs and Warner (1995) , a growing empirical literature on and interest in the resource curse paradox was generated. According to this paradox, resource rich countries perform poorly when compared to countries which are not endowed with oil, natural gas, minerals and other non-renewable resources. Therefore, resource abundance is believed to be an important determinant of economic failure, which implies that oil abundance is a curse and not a blessing.
There are di¤erent explanations for why resource rich economies might be subject to this curse. Dutch disease (see Corden and Neary (1982) , Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) , and Krugman (1987) ) is one of the channels through which the resource curse makes itself felt: an increase in natural resource revenue leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which raises the cost (in foreign currency) of exports of the products of other industries, making them less competitive with possible negative e¤ects on economic activity. Economic growth might also be adversely a¤ected by the resulting re-allocation of resources from the high-tech and high-skill manufacturing sector to the low-tech and low-skill natural resource sector. Another explanation for the resource curse paradox is based on rent-seeking theories, which argue that natural resource abundance generates an incentive for economic agents to engage in non-productive activities and for the state to provide fewer public goods than the optimum. See for instance, Lane and Tornell (1996) , Leite and Weidmann (1999) , Tornell and Lane (1999) , and Collier and Hoe-er (2004) . Finally, Mehlum et al. (2006) have attempted to show that the impact of natural resources on growth and development depends primarily on institutions, while Boschini et al. (2007) have argued that the type of natural resources possessed is also an important factor. It is not our goal to discuss these theories in detail, or to determine their validity. We refer to Sachs and Warner (1995) , Rosser (2006) , and Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for an extensive examination of these prominent accounts of the natural resource curse paradox, as well as van der Ploeg and Venables (2009) for a more recent survey.
The empirical evidence on the resource curse paradox is rather mixed. Most papers in the literature tend to follow Sachs and Warner's cross-sectional speci…cation, introducing new explanatory variables for resource dependence/abundance, while others derive theoretical models that are loosely related to their empirical speci…cation. Some of them con…rm Sachs and Warner's results (see Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) , Gylfason et al. (1999) , and Bulte et al. (2005) among others); others tend to shed doubt on the validity of the resource curse paradox (see Alexeev and Conrad (2009) , Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) , Cavalcanti et al. (2011) , and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) ).
An important drawback in most of these studies is their measure of resource abundance. Sachs and Warner (1995) , for instance, use the ratio of primary-product exports to GDP in the initial period as a measure of resource abundance. This ratio, as clearly pointed out by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) , measures resource dependence rather than abundance. The latter should be introduced in the growth regressions as the stock or the ‡ow of natural resources. Moreover, a cross sectional growth regression augmented with this regressor clearly su¤ers from endogeneity and omitted variable problems. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the so-called resource curse does not exist, and that while resource dependence, when instrumented in growth regressions, does not a¤ect growth, resource abundance in fact positively a¤ects economic growth. The positive e¤ect of resource abundance on development and growth is also supported by Esfahani et al. (2009) , who develop a long run growth model for three major oil exporting economies and derive conditions under which oil revenues are likely to have a lasting impact. However, their approach contrasts with the standard literature on "Dutch disease" and the "resource curse", which primarily focuses on the short run implications of a temporary resource discovery. On the other hand, Stijns (2005) , using di¤erent measures for resource abundance, indicates that the e¤ect of this variable on growth is ambiguous.
Another branch of the literature investigates the channels through which natural resource abundance a¤ects economic growth negatively. Gylfason (2001) , for instance, shows that natural resource abundance appears to crowd out human capital investment with negative e¤ects on the pace of economic activity, while Bravo-Ortega et al. (2005) show that higher educational attainments can in fact o¤set the negative e¤ects of resource abundance. Therefore, it can be seen that the empirical …ndings on the resource curse paradox are still not conclusive.
There are a number of grounds on which the econometric evidence of the e¤ects of resource abundance on growth may be questioned. Firstly, the literature relies primarily on a cross-sectional approach to test the resource curse hypothesis, and as such does not take into account the time dimension of the data. As noted above, the cross-sectional approach is also subject to endogeneity problems, and this is perhaps the most important reason for being skeptical about the …ndings of such econometric studies suggesting a positive or negative association between resource abundance and growth. Secondly, the vast majority of existing studies focus on the e¤ects of resource abundance on the rate of economic growth, even though most growth models in the Solow/Ramsey tradition suggest that the e¤ects on growth should be transitory, though could be permanent for the level of per capita income.
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In addition, even when panel data techniques are employed, most studies make use of homogeneous panel data approaches, such as the traditional …xed and random e¤ects estimators, which often apply the instrumental variable (IV) technique proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) , and the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , among others.
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While homogeneous panel data models allow the intercepts to di¤er across countries all other parameters are constrained to be the same. Therefore, a high degree of homogeneity is still imposed.
As discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995) , the problem with these dynamic panel data techniques, when applied to testing growth e¤ects, is that they can produce inconsistent and 1 This is also consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) . In a di¤erent setting, Henry (2007) calls into question the usefulness of the cross-county approach to testing the relationship between capital account liberalization and growth. He argues that the capital deepening channel of gain from …nancial integration should imply only a temporary, rather than a permanent, increase in growth, but most of the cross-sectional studies that have been conducted do not test this.
2 For a comprehensive survey of the econometric methods employed in the growth literature, and some of their shortcomings, see Durlauf et al. (2005) and Durlauf et al. (2009). potentially very misleading estimates of the average values of the parameters, since growth models typically exhibit substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity. In fact Lee et al. (1997) , using a panel of data on 102 countries, illustrate that there is pervasive heterogeneity in speeds of convergence and in growth rates across countries and show that the conventional method of imposing homogeneity are subject to substantial biases. In addition, Lee et al. (1998) test the null hypothesis of homogeneity in growth rates as well as the null of common speed of convergence and …nd that these hypotheses are rejected for 102 non-oil countries. The same test outcomes are obtained for 61 intermediate group of countries, while for 22 OECD countries the null of a common speed of convergence is not rejected.
More recently Pedroni (2007) shows that there are signi…cant di¤erences in the aggregate production functions across countries. By taking into account these di¤erences he argues that it is possible to explain the observed patterns of per capita income divergence across countries. Finally, the current econometric evidence does not address the problem of crosssectional dependence arising from common unobserved factors or shocks. Thus estimations and inference based on models that do not take into account cross-country heterogeneity and dependence, such as the cross-sectional speci…cations widely used in the literature, can yield biased and misleading results. In this paper we adopt a di¤erent approach in order to test the resource curse hypothesis. We explicitly recognize that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the growth experience of di¤erent resource abundant countries and therefore use a heterogeneous panel data approach, which allows for di¤erent dynamics across countries. We also account for crosscountry error dependencies that potentially arise from the presence of multiple unobserved common factors, and allow the individual responses to these factors to di¤er across countries. A possible source of cross-sectional dependency might be due to world-wide common shocks that a¤ect all cross-sectional units, but with di¤erent intensities. Changes in technology and in the price of oil provide examples of such common shocks that may a¤ect real GDP per capita, but to di¤erent degrees across countries. 4 To address the issues raised above we adopt the common correlated e¤ects estimator of Pesaran (2006) , a su¢ ciently general and ‡exible econometric approach, which is applicable under both cross-section dependence and cross-country heterogeneity. Moreover, we investigate the long-run (level) e¤ects of natural resource abundance on domestic output as well as the short-run (growth) e¤ects through an Error Correction Model (ECM). We also check the robustness of our long-run results by using the fully modi…ed OLS method of Pedroni (2000) . An advantage of our non-stationary panel data approach is that the …xed e¤ects and the heterogeneous trends capture countryspeci…c unobserved factors, such as social and human capital, which are very di¢ cult to measure or observe accurately. In addition, omitted variables that are either constant or evolve smoothly over time are absorbed into the country speci…c deterministic trend. Furthermore, we develop a standard theoretical growth model that requires the use of natural resources as an input in the production of the consumption good. We view natural resources as a proxy for energy and power. We assume that agents can extract natural resources at a rate which is optimally determined, and rent them out to …rms for production. In contrast to the literature on exhaustible natural resources and economic growth, for instance Dasgupta and Heal (1974) , we assume that costly investment will enable new reserves to be found and old …elds to be developed. It is important to emphasize that while we do not believe that natural resources are limitless, oil production and more importantly viable reserves do seem to increase over the horizon we are investigating empirically. 5 Finally, our theoretical model suggests a long run relationship between per capita income, the investment rate and the real value of oil production per capita which we use as the basis of our empirical investigation.
In contrast to most studies in the literature, our results, using the real value of oil production, rent and reserves as a proxy for resource abundance, indicate that oil abundance is in fact a blessing and not a curse. Estimating a panel error correction model, we also show that oil abundance has a signi…cantly positive growth e¤ect in the short run.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the growth theory underlying our econometric model. Section 3 provides a brief review of our panel data model and the estimation methods employed. Section 4 reports the estimation results, and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
The Theoretical Model
One of the major drawbacks of the empirical literature on growth and natural resource abundance is the lack of an explicit theoretical model. Either an ad hoc approach is used, in which output growth is regressed on a number of variables that are arbitrary chosen, or a theoretical model is developed but when it comes to estimation the econometric model is not connected to the theory derived restrictions. To address this drawback, this paper develops a robust, theoretically informed econometric model, in order to test the resource curse paradox.
We suppose that the economy under consideration is populated by a continuum of identical …rms of measure one. The representative …rm uses physical capital, K(t), labor, L(t), and natural resources, O(t), to produce the consumption good, Y (t), according to the following production function:
where A(t) = A(0)e gt is the labor augmenting technical progress, and A(0) is an economyspeci…c initial endowment of technology. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale. We could also assume, as in Romer (1990) , that the economy-wide capital stock, K(t), embodies technology, such that A(t) = G(K(t)). In this case, and at the aggregate level, the economy would exhibit increasing returns to scale. All results derived in this section would hold as long as the externality of the capital stock is not very large. 6 Otherwise, the 5 If natural resources in our model represent power and energy used in production, we can also view the increase in reserves as discovery of new energy sources. 6 For instance, if G(K(t)) = K(t) growth rates would not be stationary in the long run and would grow over time. This, however, is not consistent with the empirical observation or the evidence on conditional convergence (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) ). We could also include human capital as an input in the production process but we abstract from this to simplify the analysis. In fact, in Section 3, we argue that our non-stationary panel approach allows us to capture both human capital, in the form of education, and social capital, in the form of social and political institutions, as these e¤ects are absorbed by the …xed e¤ects and the heterogeneous trends in our speci…cation, as will be set out in equation (15) .
Let r(t), p(t), and w(t) denote the rental price of capital, natural resources, and labor, respectively. Competition implies that factors are remunerated according to their marginal productivity, such that:
Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, pro…ts are zero, and …rm ownership is not important. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical in…nitely lived households with measure one. We can therefore work with a representative household, which grows at the exogenous rate, n, such that: N (t) = N (0)e nt , and N (0) is the initial endowment of labour. Each household member is endowed with a unit of productive time as well as K (0), the initial level of capital stock. Capital is rented to …rms for production of the consumption good and depreciates at rate . Let I K (t) be investment in physical capital. Therefore:
Let c(t) denote real per capita household consumption with preferences de…ned as
where > 0 is the subjective discount rate. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. In addition to capital, households are also endowed with a stock of natural resources, S(t), which can be extracted at rate (t) and rented out to …rms for the production of the consumption good. New reserves can be found and old …elds can be developed, but this requires investment, I S (t), such that for each unit of investment households have to pay
units of output. We assume that this cost is convex, such that 0 ( ) 0 and 00 ( ) 0, and that (0) = 0 (0) = 0. The evolution of the stock of natural resources is then given by
where the initial stock of natural resources, S(0); is given. For the sake of notation, we will abstract from the time indicator variable from here on. The problem faced by the representative household is to choose the path of consumption, c, natural resource extraction rate, , investment in natural resources, I S , capital, K, and the stock of natural resources, S, so as to maximize
Equation (3) corresponds to the household's budget constraint, and (5) states the constraint on the choice variables. The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is then given by
where and are the costate variables for physical capital and the stock of natural resources, respectively. In equilibrium, we have that O = S, L = N , and:
Equations (6) and (7) correspond to the change in the shadow price of capital and the traditional Euler equation, respectively. Condition (8) states that the marginal cost of investment in natural resources is equal to its shadow value. Equation (9) is the condition on the rate of extraction, , and equation (10) de…nes the change in the shadow price of S.
Equations (11) and (12) are the resource constraint and the evolution of the stock of natural resources, respectively. Finally, equation (13) de…nes the transversality conditions: one for physical capital and another for the stock of natural resources. For any variable X, let us de…ne variablex = X e ( g X ) t , in which g X is the growth rate of variable X along the balanced growth path, or the long-run equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider the above growth model and let 0 ( ) > 0, 00 ( ) 0, and (0) = 0 (0) = 0.
Then, there exists a non-zero balanced growth path equilibrium withk
2. In addition, if p is determined in the world market, 7 then this balanced growth path is saddle-path stable.
Proof. See Appendix A Part one of proposition 1 suggests that along the balanced growth path, the rate of natural resource extraction is constant, 8 with the growth rate of both output and natural resources per capita equal to the rate of technological progress, g. This implies that contrary to other models with exhaustible natural resources, our model does not imply a long run degenerated level of output. If oil can be imported or exported a similar balanced growth path equilibrium would hold.
Part two of proposition 1 states that if the price of the natural resource is determined in the international market, being exogenously given, then the non-zero balanced growth path equilibrium is saddle-path stable, which implies that there exists a one dimensional stable manifold converging to this long run equilibrium.
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Writing the production function (1) in terms of the steady state values of the variables in our model denoted by :
or equivalently:
we can use the equation of motion of capital to write the above as:
( e y t )
and taking the natural logarithm we have:
or equivalently in per capita terms
where lower case letters denote variables in per capita terms. Equation (14) is thus the key empirical reduced form equation, which states that there is an equilibrium relationship between real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the share of capital investment in real GDP, and the real value of natural resource (oil) production per capita. In fact this equilibrium relation is consistent with any long-run model in which oil production to income ratio is strictly positive. A similar relationship is also derived in Esfahani et al. (2009) in which they distinguish between the two cases where the growth of oil income, g 0 , is less than the natural growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and the growth of technical progress, g) and when g 0 g + n. Under the former, the e¤ects of oil income on the economy's steady growth rate will vanish eventually, whilst under the latter, oil income enters the long run output equation as it does in our model in equation (14).
The Econometric Model and Methodology
Our theoretical model, derived in Section 2, suggested a long run relationship between real gross domestic product (GDP), the investment share of GDP, and oil production. Using equation (14) we can write a panel model for oil producing countries, both net exporters and importers, as an equilibrium relationship compatible with the long-run theory developed:
where ln y jt is the logarithm of real GDP per capita for countries j = 1; :::; J and time periods t = 1; :::; T . Likewise ln o jt is the logarithm of real value of oil production per capita and ln(I=Y ) jt is log of the investment share of GDP over the same countries and time periods, with a j denoting country speci…c …xed e¤ects and d j t representing heterogeneous country speci…c deterministic trends. Also remember that the slope coe¢ cients are directly related to shares of capital and oil in output given that: j1 = . Two features of the above long-run relation are worth noting; while in the augmented Solow and Ramsey models the parameters 1 and 2 in equation (1) are traditionally taken to be common across all countries, we do not impose this restriction as this is a feature of the model that we wish to investigate. This is also clear from our econometric speci…cation in which the parameter vector of the slope coe¢ cients, j = j1 ; j2 0 , is allowed to be heterogeneous across countries. Similarly, we do not impose homogeneity of the depreciation rate, j , or the growth rates of labour, n j , and technology, g j , which is accommodated through the …xed e¤ects and the deterministic trends. While equation (15) de…nes the theory derived long-run relation for oil producing countries, the short-run dynamics and their adjustment to the long-run across countries are accommodated through the error term, u jt ; which is assumed to have the following multi-factor error structure:
where f t is a vector of unobserved common shocks, which can be stationary or nonstationary (see Kapetanios et al. (2011) ) and are allowed to be serially correlated and possibly correlated with the logarithm of the investment share, ln(I=Y ) jt , as well as oil production, ln (o jt ). The individual-speci…c errors, " jt , are allowed to be serially correlated over time and weakly dependent across countries, but are assumed to be distributed independently of both the regressors and the unobserved common factors. Following Pesaran (2006) , assuming a random coe¢ cient model, j = + $ j , where $ j IID(0; V $ ), we focus on the estimation of the average value of j , namely . To eliminate cross sectional dependence (CD) asymptotically, arising from both strong factors (like oil price shocks or the global …nancial crisis) and weak factors (such as local spillover e¤ects), we make use of the Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) type estimators developed by Pesaran (2006) . These estimators augment the OLS regression in equation (15) with the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the regressors -which act as proxies for unobserved common factors. Note that the CCE estimation method allows countries to respond di¤erently to the unobserved shocks. One of the estimators pools observations over the cross sectional units and is called the CCE pooled (CCEP) estimator. If the share of capital in output, j1 , and the share of oil in output, j2 , are the same across countries, thus implying that the individual country slope coe¢ cients, j , are the same, then e¢ ciency gains from pooling observations can be achieved. The other estimator, CCE mean group (CCEMG), additionally allows coe¢ cients of interest to vary across countries and is de…ned as a simple average of the individual country CCE estimators given by:
Although our econometric speci…cation is simple it is also very general. For instance, as opposed to the traditional cross-sectional and/or homogenous panel approaches in which one needs to …nd quanti…able variables that can act as proxies for unobserved factors, in our non-stationary panel approach the country speci…c deterministics, a j and d j t, capture a broad class of those variables. In addition, the unobserved common components of u jt absorb a number of di¤erent factors that drive real output but are at the same time di¢ cult to measure accurately. Changes in technology and in the price of oil as well as local spillover e¤ects provide examples of such (world-wide) common shocks that may a¤ect real GDP per capita, but to di¤erent degrees across countries. 10 10 Another way of dealing with cross-country dependence is to apply the cross-sectionally augmented Pooled Mean Group (CPMG) approach, see Cavalcanti et al. (2011) for more details. This estimator, just like CCEMG and CCEP, augments the original regression equation with the cross-sectional averages of the regressors and the dependent variable, however, it uses the ML rather than OLS method for estimation.
Moreover, any omitted variables that are either constant or evolve smoothly over time are also absorbed into the country speci…c …xed e¤ects and the heterogeneous trend components. Furthermore, although our theoretical model does not include human capital, in the form of education, or social capital, in the form of social and political institutions, these unobserved and di¢ cult to measure factors are in fact captured by a j and d j t in our cointegrated panel speci…cation, see Pedroni (2007) . Finally, another advantage of our non-stationary panel approach is that we explicitly estimate the long-run (low-frequency) relationships among the variables, using annual data rather than trying to take …ve-year averages to …lter out business cycle ‡uctuations common in the growth literature. This is in contrast to the traditional stationary dynamic and static panel approaches which might inadvertently uncover highfrequency relationships, see Durlauf and Quah (1999) . The estimators are also consistent under cointegration and are robust to the omission of variables that are not part of the equilibrium relation de…ned in equation (14).
Empirical Results
To empirically test our theoretical model we obtain annual data from 1980 to 2006 on the logarithm of the real gross domestic product per capita, ln y jt , the logarithm of the investment share of real GDP, ln (I=Y ) jt , and the logarithm of the real value of oil production per capita, ln o jt . As we assume, but also prove, in Section 2 that oil production is a constant fraction, , of the total stock of oil reserves available, we are able to perform a robustness check by estimating our econometric model, given by equation (15), with the real value of oil reserves per capita, ln s jt , instead of ln o jt . As we also have access to data on oil rent for di¤erent countries a further robustness check is performed replacing ln o jt with the real value of oil rent per capita, ln or jt . Our data set covers 53 countries, see Table 9 , the number for which oil production and rent data is available. As we do not have oil reserve data for Hungary, we estimate the equation with ln s jt (also later referred to as speci…cation (c)) using the remaining 52 countries. Out of the 53 countries included in our sample 10 belong to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but our sample also includes 17 out of the 30 OECD countries. As such there is a large degree of heterogeneity across countries. These 53 countries together cover 85 percent of world GDP, 77 percent of world oil production per day, and 81 percent of world proven oil reserves. Thus our sample is very comprehensive. A more detailed description of our data and their sources are provided in Appendix B.
Cross-sectional Estimation
Before we proceed to test our theory-derived econometric model, following Sachs and Warner (1995) we employ a standard cross-sectional estimation technique to investigate the growth e¤ects of resource abundance.
11 Accordingly, we estimate the following equation:
11 For a recent review of the cross-country growth literature see Eberhardt and Teal (2011). where g y;j is the average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product per capita between 1980 and 2006 for country j = 1:::; J, and ln y 80;j is the logarithm of the initial GDP per capita (in 1980) . I=Y is the average investment share of GDP and ln o j is the average of the logarithm of the real value of oil production per capita between 1980 and 2006. We also estimate equation (18) The estimation results of the three cross-sectional speci…cations are reported in Table 1 .
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While the coe¢ cients of the investment share are signi…cantly positive, the estimated values for the three measures of resource abundance are all statistically signi…cant and negative, thus suggesting that the resource curse is present for the countries in our sample. However, as discussed in the introduction, these cross-sectional estimates as well as the homogenous panel results in the literature are subject to a number of important problems. For example, the regressions assume that the slope coe¢ cients are homogeneous across countries, that the errors are cross-sectionally independent, and that there are no omitted variables. Given these observations, we employ the estimation procedure developed by Pesaran (2006) and applied in Holly et al. (2010) to see whether the resource curse is in fact present in our sample or whether the evidence of the resource curse is due to the limitations of the cross-sectional regressions used. Moreover, the insigni…cance of the coe¢ cient of ln y 80;j can be associated to the large cross country heterogeneity that exists in our sample of 53 countries. We provide strong evidence for conditional convergence to country-speci…c steady states in our sample of oil producing countries when we account for slope heterogeneity in the ECM estimations.
Panel Unit Root Test Results
Before we proceed with estimation of our model we need to test for cross sectional dependence of the errors and to consider the unit root properties of the variables in our model. It is important to make sure that we do not work with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables so that we can make sensible interpretation of the long-run relationships. We start by looking at the CD (Cross-section Dependence) test of Pesaran (2004) , which tends to a normal distribution as the number of countries tend to in…nity, and is based on the average of the pair-wise correlations of the OLS residuals from the individual regressions of (15) in the panel. Table  2 reports the cross sectional dependence of the residuals from the ADF(p) regressions of the logs of real GDP per capita, investment share of GDP, as well as the real value of oil production, rent, and reserves and their lagged di¤erences, over the period 1980 to 2006 across all of the 53 countries. For each p = 0; 1; 2; and 3, the reported CD statistics are highly signi…cant, with the three oil related variables displaying very large test statistics. The presence of the cross sectional dependence implies that the use of standard panel unit root tests, such as the test proposed by Im et al. (2003) , from now on the IPS test, are not valid. 
P J k=j+1^ jk , with^ jk being the correlation coe¢ cient of the ADF(p) regression residuals between j th and k th cross section units, tends to N (0; 1) under the null hypothesis of no error cross section dependence. For more details see Pesaran (2004). Given the above results, to perform panel unit root tests we will make use of the crosssectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test proposed by Pesaran (2007) . This test follows the CCE approach and …lters out the cross section dependence by augmenting the ADF regressions carried out separately for each country with cross section averages. 13 The cross sectional augmented ADF (CADF) statistics are reported in Table 3 for di¤erent lag orders, from which it is clear that for all of our variables including investment shares, 14 at the log-level and with or without a trend, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level, and for most variables not even at the 10 percent level. On the other hand the unit root hypothesis is clearly rejected when applied to the …rst di¤erences of these variables. Thus we can safely regard all the variables as I(1), remaining con…dent that there is not a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables in our model. Pesaran (2007) . The relevant lower 1, 5, and 10 percent critical values for the CIPS statistics are -2.23, -2.11, and -2.04 with an intercept case, and -2.73, -2.61, and -2.54 with an intercept and a linear trend case, respectively. Symbols denote *10%, **5%, ***1% rejections.
Panel Level E¤ects
Having established that all of our variables are I(1), we proceed by estimating the following equation:
which we label as (a). But as previously discussed we also estimate the above equation by replacing the per capita real value of oil production, ln o jt , with (b) the per capita value of oil rent, ln or jt , and (c) the value of oil reserves per capita, ln s jt . The results for the three speci…cations, (a) to (c), are shown in Table 4 . It is clear that the coe¢ cient of oil in all of our speci…cations is signi…cantly positive and thus in line with our theoretical model, implying that oil abundance leads to a positive level e¤ect. The …rst three columns report the mean group (MG) estimates, which assume that the errors are cross-sectionally independent. While the estimates suggest similar coe¢ cients on the investment share, those of the real value of oil production and rent are considerably smaller compared to the common correlated e¤ects mean group (CCEMG) estimates, although not far from the common correlated e¤ects pooled (CCEP) estimates. Not surprisingly there is also evidence of cross sectional dependence for the MG estimation errors. For the CCEP and CCEMG estimations we augment equation (19) with the simple cross sectional averages of all of our regressors and the dependant variable. From the CD test statistics it is clear that this augmentation has led to reduction of cross sectional dependence, to such extent that we cannot reject at the 10 percent level the null of no cross sectional dependence for either of the two CCE type estimators. The last three columns report the CCEP estimates which have smaller coe¢ cients on all of the variables as compared to the MG estimates. Finally, the CCEMG estimates have signi…cantly larger coe¢ cients on both the investment share of output and the oil variables as compared to the CCEP estimates. We argue that while the countries in our data set all produce oil, there are substantial heterogeneity among them: some countries are net exporters while others are net importers of oil; some are developed others are developing; in addition, they have di¤erent geographical locations. Given this level of heterogeneity across countries we focus on the results of the CCEMG estimates which are reported in the middle panel of Table 4 .
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The theoretical model in equation (14) provided two expressions for the estimated share of capital in output,
, and the share of oil in output, b 2 = b 2 (1 b 1 ). As expected, these shares vary depending on which oil variable we use in our analysis, however, it is clear from Table 5 that for the full sample in all cases b 1 > b 2 , and their sum is about one-third. While the estimated shares of capital and oil are very similar using oil production, (a), and oil rent, (b), the values obtained using oil reserves, (c), are smaller for both 1 and 2 . However, as previously mentioned no matter how the oil variable is measured the results indicate that the e¤ect of oil on GDP is signi…cantly positive.
To make sure that these results are not driven by a few countries with large coe¢ cients on the oil variables, we look at the individual country CCEMG estimates for each of the three speci…cations considered. 16 For the full sample, the coe¢ cients of the investment share and the three oil variables all lie within an expected range. There are only eight countries Pesaran (2006) . Symbols ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively.
for which oil production has a negative e¤ect on real output and nine countries for which oil rent has the same e¤ect. However, this e¤ect is only signi…cantly negative for …ve countries (Chile, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand) all of whom are net importers of oil. Thus even at the individual country level there is no evidence that oil abundance, as measured by oil production and rent values, stunts development. On the other hand using oil reserves we …nd a signi…cant negative e¤ect of oil abundance on 11 out of the 53 countries in our sample; 17 of which only …ve are net exporters of oil. However, as only …ve out of the 30 oil exporters in our sample have a negative coe¢ cient on oil reserves in the CCEMG estimations, overall the results of the individual country estimates suggest that oil abundance does not stunt development, thus echoing the results obtained using oil production and rent values.
We split the sample into three subsets: net oil exporting countries (EX), countries that are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
18 Reestimating speci…cations (a) to (c), using these subsets, we report in Table 5 the CCEMG estimates of the shares of oil and capital in output. For all three subsets, just like in the full sample, the estimates for b 1 and b 2 , have the correct signs and are very similar when considering the speci…cations with oil rent and oil production. In addition, while b 1 is signi…cantly positive for all countries in the subsets, b 2 is positive but only signi…cant for the oil exporters and the OPEC countries.
The estimates using oil reserve data, (c), are however, signi…cantly smaller for both the (4) with the simple cross sectional averages of the regressors using ln o jt , whereas (b) and (c) are estimated in the same way but by using ln or jt and ln s jt respectively. EX refers to the 30 net oil exporting countries in our sample, OPEC to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting countries, and OECD to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for further details see Table 9 .
shares of capital and oil. While both b 1 and b 2 are still signi…cantly positive for the oil exporting countries, they are positive but insigni…cant for the OPEC subset. As oil reserves are de…ned as "quantities of oil that geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions" (see British Petroleum (2010)) they are subject to large margin of errors and so could be unreliable. Moreover, we argue that the ‡ow measures are better indicators of abundance as they portrait a country's ability to extract its stock and make use of the proceeds. Therefore, we will mainly depend on the results using (a) and (b). Focusing on the oil rent and production speci…cations, we can see that while for the OECD countries b 1 > b 2 , this is not the case for the OPEC and EX countries for which b 1 < b 2 , with the value of the shares being very similar when comparing the two subsets. These results are perhaps expected for these countries since the share of oil in output is quite signi…cant as oil production dominates economic activity for these countries. Notice also that the sum of b 1 and b 2 are reasonable for these two subsets being around one-third. Our estimates for the share of capital in output falls in the estimated range of 0.12 to 0.18 for the non-OECD countries and 0.17 to 0.22 for the OECD countries as provided by Pedroni (2007) . In addition, b 1 for the oil exporting countries is close to the estimates for Iran, Norway and Saudi Arabia as provided in Esfahani et al. (2009) . It is also interesting to note that for the OECD countries as a group the share of oil in output is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Again we would have expected b 2 to be very small for these countries given that they tend to be non-oil exporters.
To make sure that the results are not driven by a few outliers in the sub-samples, we look at country-speci…c estimations for the OPEC and EX countries. Overall the coe¢ cients of the oil variables and the share of investment in output are reasonable. The United Arab Emirates is the only country in OPEC for which oil rent and production have a negative e¤ect on income, but this is in fact insigni…cant. However, using oil reserves in our estimation, we …nd a signi…cant negative e¤ect of oil abundance on income for Iran and Nigeria. Turning to the results for the EX countries we …nd that there are no countries for which the coe¢ cient of oil rent and production is signi…cantly negative. On the other hand, using oil reserves we …nd that there are …ve countries (Bahrain, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Iran and Nigeria) for which oil abundance has a negative e¤ect on income. But as this is only …ve countries out of the 30 countries considered, the results do not seem to indicate that resource abundance harms development. Thus we can conclude that the estimates for the OPEC and the oil exporting countries do not seem to be a¤ected by outliers and suggest that, in the long run, oil abundance is in fact a blessing and not a curse.
Robustness Check with FMOLS Approach
To check the robustness of our results we also estimate our model using Pedroni's group mean fully modi…ed OLS (FMOLS) estimator. This methodology addresses the problem of simultaneity bias in a non-stationary static panel setting. In particular, a semi-parametric correction is made to the OLS estimator to eliminate the second order bias caused by endogenous regressors. Since our data are non-stationary, this means that by using Pedroni's FMOLS for heterogeneous cointegrated panels, we can potentially exploit the superconsistency properties of cointegrating parameters to address biases coming from endogeneity and omitted variables while at the same time partly allowing for cross-sectional dependence through common time e¤ects. 19 The FMOLS group mean estimates and the corresponding standard errors are reported in Table 6 . All of the coe¢ cients are correctly signed with those of the real value of oil production and oil rent per capita statistically signi…cant and positive. Overall, Table 6 con…rms the robustness of our previous results and provides evidence of the positive level e¤ects of oil abundance on real output. (2000) group mean FMOLS estimator. The dependent variable is the logarithm of output per capita, ln y jt . Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively.
The implied estimates for the shares of capital and oil in output are also reported in Table   19 The FMOLS approach is based on subtracting the common factors prior to estimation rather than explicitly including them as additional covariates in the model. Note that the FMOLS estimator can deal with cross-section dependence only if the common factors are I(0). For further details see Pedroni (2000) .
6. As before the share of capital is greater than that of oil, and the total shares, b 1 + b 2 , are estimated to be around one-third. Comparing these results with the shares computed using the CCEMG estimator in Table 5 , we observe that generally the share of capital is larger and the share of oil is slightly smaller using the group mean FMOLS estimator.
Panel Cointegration Test Results
We use the residuals, b e jt , obtained from the CCEMG estimation of (20) to test the null of no cointegration between real GDP per capita, the investment share of GDP, and each of the three di¤erent measures for oil, (a) to (c). The CCEMG estimation procedure applied in equation (20) asymptotically eliminates both weak as well as strong forms of cross sectional dependence in large panels. Thus our cointegration test is based on the IPS test procedure, as our goal is to determine whether the residuals, b e jt , contain a unit root or not. The panel cointegration test results are displayed in Table 7a and suggest rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all three speci…cations even at the one percent level and for all the augmentation orders, p = 0; 1; 2; and 3. Notes: -statistic, PP, and ADF columns report the Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 group mean tests for null of no cointegration. Fixed e¤ects and heterogeneous trends have been included in all cases. Symbols denote *10%, **5%, ***1% rejections.
To check the robustness of our results we also apply Pedroni's (1999 Pedroni's ( , 2004 tests for the null hypothesis of no cointegration to the residuals, b u jt from the hypothesized cointegrating relationship in equation (19), but also using (b) oil rent and (c) reserves measures. The three panel cointegration test statistics based on a group mean approach are reported in Table 7b . The …rst one is analogous to the Phillips and Perron -statistic, and the other two are analogous to the Phillips and Perron t-statistic (non parametric) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic (parametric) . 20 Looking at the results for the raw data, as reported in the …rst three columns, we see that all tests reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level and in most cases even at the one percent level. When using data that have been demeaned with respect to the cross-sectional dimension for each time period, 21 we reject the null at the one percent level using the ADF and -statistics. The PP test statistics on the other hand suggest rejection of the null at the 10 percent level using (a) oil production and (b) rent data, but cannot reject the null using (c) oil reserves data. Thus in general the results, based on both the IPS and the Pedroni tests, suggest the existence of cointegrating relationships among the variables in our model for all three speci…cations, (a) to (c).
Panel Error Correction Speci…cations
Having established panel cointegration between real GDP per capita, the share of investment in real GDP, and the real value of oil production per capita (as well as real value of oil reserves and real oil rent per capita), we now estimate the following panel error correction model ln y jt = e j + j ln y j;t 1 j1 ln(I=Y ) j;t 1 j2 ln o j;t 1
to determine the short-run and the long-run e¤ects of oil on real GDP per capita. To investigate these e¤ects, …rstly we need to consider whether j , the coe¢ cients on ln y j;t 1 ; are statistically di¤erent from zero. If this is not the case, the cointegration results would not be reliable. Secondly, we need to test the null hypothesis that the parameter vector of the shortrun response coe¢ cients, j = ( j1 ; 2j; j3 ) 0 , are equal to zero. If the null cannot be rejected, then there would be no evidence for short run dynamics. Table 8 displays the results from estimating the above equation. As before there is considerable cross sectional dependence in the MG regressions, see the …rst three columns. To address this issue, we computed CCEMG and CCEP estimates by augmenting equation (21) with simple cross sectional averages of the regressors. To check the robustness of our estimates we also estimated equation (21) by replacing ln o jt with ln or jt and ln s jt . The coe¢ cients on ln y j;t 1 ; in all speci…cations are statistically signi…cant and di¤erent from zero indicating that the system reverts to the longrun values following a shock. All other estimated coe¢ cients are correctly signed with the coe¢ cients of the real value of oil production and rent statistically signi…cant and positive in both the short-run and the long-run, indicating that oil abundance has both positive level and growth e¤ects. These …ndings shed doubts on the results based on the pure crosssectional speci…cations usually employed in the literature, as reported in Section 4.1, and suggest that the cross-sectional estimates could be misleading.
When estimating equation (21) using the real value of oil reserves instead of production, while the MG and the CCEMG estimates show statistically signi…cant and positive coe¢ -cients for ln s jt 1 and ln s jt , the CCEP estimates although being positive are insigni…cant. Notes: The country speci…c intercepts are estimated but not reported. MG stands for Mean Group estimates while CCEMG and CCEP denote the Common Correlated E¤ects Mean Group and Pooled estimates respectively. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of output per capita, ln y jt . Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively.
As we believe that there is considerable heterogeneity and cross sectional dependence across countries in our sample, we focus on the CCEMG estimates, which generally has signi…cantly larger coe¢ cients on both the investment share of output and the oil variables considered as compared to the MG and CCEP estimates. The estimated share of capital in output, b 1 , and the share of oil in output, b 2 , vary depending on which oil variable we use in our analysis, but are very close and in line with those reported in Table 5 . As before the share of capital in output is larger than the share of oil in output and they sum to less than one-third. The coe¢ cients of the short-run parameters suggest an elasticity of real income with respect to both production and rent per capita of around 11 percent, with the reserve elasticity of income at two percent. Our results then seem to con…rm that oil abundance has both a positive level (long-run) as well as growth (short-run) e¤ects.
To check the robustness of our results to the choice of natural resource considered, we performed the same estimations with the three measures of (a) real value of production, (b) rent, and (c) reserves per capita but by using natural gas as well as combining natural gas and oil data and obtained very similar results to the ones reported in Tables 4 and 8 . For the sake of space, these results are not reported but are available upon request.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has re-visited the resource curse paradox in a panel made up of 53 countries over 27 years. The sample covered 85 percent of world GDP, 77 percent of world oil production, and 81 percent of world proven oil reserves. Not surprisingly, there is substantial degree of cross country heterogeneity. We started o¤ by developing a theory consistent econometric model, which suggested a long run relationship between the variables in our model. We then employed the Common Correlated E¤ects type estimators developed in Pesaran (2006) to test whether natural resource abundance is a curse or a blessing, and also contrasted these results with those of the FMOLS approach of Pedroni (2000) .
Using the Cross-section Dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004) we were able to establish that the errors of the variables in our model in fact exhibit a considerable degree of cross sectional dependence. Due to the presence of this cross sectional dependence, we employed Pesaran's CIPS test to determine whether these variables are non-stationary or not. Having established that they are, we tested the e¤ects of the real value of: (a) oil production, (b) rent, and (c) reserve on real income. We mainly relied on the CCEMG estimates as they explicitly take into account both cross sectional dependence and cross country heterogeneity among the countries in our sample. The results suggested that the e¤ect of oil abundance on real income is signi…cantly positive. In addition, the CCEMG estimates suggested that the share of capital in output, b 1 , is larger than the share of oil in output, b 2 , with their sum being about one-third. To ensure that the results are not a¤ected by outliers we looked at the individual country estimates and were able to con…rm that the coe¢ cients of the investment share and the three oil variables are all sensible and in line with the full sample estimations. As a further robustness check we estimated our model using Pedroni's group mean fully modi…ed OLS (FMOLS) estimator and obtained very similar results. In addition, we performed cointegration tests, using the IPS methodology as well as Pedroni's cointegration tests, and were able to reject the null of no cointegration for all the speci…cations considered, providing empirical support for the theory derived long-run relationship between the variables in our model.
We also estimated separate models for oil exporters as a whole, the OPEC member countries, as well as the OECD countries. The results con…rmed that in all three sets of country groupings, oil abundance has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on real income. It is interesting to note that while b 2 0 for the OECD countries, b 2 > 0 and statistically signi…cant for the oil exporting countries. We would expect this result for the oil exporting countries (both the EX and the OPEC subsets), as the share of oil in real GDP is very large because oil production dominates economic activity for these countries.
To determine the short-run e¤ects of oil abundance, we estimated a panel error correction model. All of the estimated oil variable coe¢ cients, using (a) to (c), are positively signed and statistically signi…cant, thus indicating that oil abundance has short-run growth enhancing e¤ects. Moreover, the shares of oil and capital in output are in line with what is expected and the elasticity of oil in income is around 11 percent when using oil production and rent as a proxy for resource abundance, while only being around two percent when using oil reserves. In general, the estimates using oil reserves, although statistically signi…cant and positive, are weaker that the ones using oil production and rent. We argue that the ‡ow measures are better indicators of abundance as they portrait a country's ability to extract its stock and make use of the proceeds. Our results suggest that oil abundance has both short-run growth enhancing as well as positive level e¤ects on real income. Therefore, oil abundance by itself does not seem to be a curse. Thus, in light of our results, we believe that the question should not be whether having a large endowment of natural resources is bad or good for an economy, but instead focus should be placed on how these resource abundant economies could be made better o¤ by adopting growth and welfare enhancing policies and institutions. which veri…es our guess. For instance, if we assume that
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Rewriting (9) as:
wherex is the intensive from of X and de…ned byx = X e g X t , in which g X is the growth rate of variable X in the balanced growth path, and (7) as:
and writing the production function (1) in intensive form: ; it is obvious that e y > 0. But this implies that both e o and e k are positive, and since is positive, it in turn means that e o = e s > 0. This proves part 1 of proposition 1. The system of equations that describes the equilibrium dynamics is given by:
where for any variablex, The determinant of the matrix of partial derivative is (1 1 ) ( + + g)c k < 0. The trace of this matrix is ( + g) (n + g) + , and it is positive to satisfy the transversality conditions. These two results imply that one eigenvalue is negative, while the other two are positive, which completes the proof.
Appendix B: Sources and Construction of the Data
The panel data set used in this study is balanced and contains annual data from the World Bank (2010b) on the values of oil production and oil rent for all of the 53 countries reported in Table 9 , over the period 1980-2006. Oil reserve 22 data is available for all of the countries in our data set from the Energy Information Administration, see United States Department of Energy (2010). For Hungary reserve data is available only from 1992, as such it is excluded from the estimations with ln s jt . The data on GDP for all countries is obtained from the World Bank (2010a), but is not available for Bahrain (2006) , for which we obtain the 2006 GDP …gure by applying the growth rate of GDP in 2006 from the Central Bank of Bahrain. GDP data is also missing for Kuwait (1990 Kuwait ( -1994 so we obtain the missing data by splicing the GDP series from the Penn World Table Version 6 .3, see Heston et al. (2009) . 23 Finally the World Bank does not have GDP or gross capital formation for Qatar until 2000, so we use the Penn World Table data until then and obtain data for the later years by splicing the World Bank data. Our main source for data on gross …xed capital formation is the World Bank, but data is missing for Argentina (1980 Argentina ( -1992 , Colombia (2000 ), and Oman (1983 -1989 but available from the International Monetary Fund (2010) International Financial Statistics database and so we make use of that instead. Gross …xed capital formation data is also missing for Brunei (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and Romania (1980 Romania ( , 1983 Romania ( -1989 , but as this is not available from the IMF, it is obtained by splicing the data from the Penn World Table Version 6.3, see Heston et al. (2009) . The nominal values were converted into real terms using the US GDP de ‡ator from World Bank (2010a). 22 Quantities of oil that geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. 23 The missing data is retrieved by applying the growth rate of the PWT series to the World Bank data. Notes: Annual data between 1980 and 2006 (T = 27) for 53 Countries (N = 53), except for oil reserves for which we only have data for 52 countries (Hungary is excluded from this sample).
